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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 16176 
JACK CRANNEY, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT 
The appellant submits the following reply brief pursuant to Rule 
75(p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant contends 
that the respondents have raised two issues in their brief on appeal 
that warrant a reply brief. The respondents have contended that 
even if the trial court's findings will not support respondents' 
contention in the trial court that a joint tenancy arrangement 
existed between appellant and respondent with reference to the 
Classic Mining Company s~ock, that respondent at least has a coten-
ancy arrangement in said stock. Second, respondent contends that 
since the transaction in this case was in the nature of replevin as 
initially maintained by the appellant that appellant has the burden 
of proof in the instant action. It is submitted that with reference 
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to both matter• respondent is in error and that one of these conten-
tion• wa1 not properly before the Court having been raised for the 
flr1t time on appeal. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS NO COTENANCY INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY OF CLASSIC MINING STOCK SINCE, (l) THE 
PLEA OF COTENANCY IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL AND (2) THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH 
CLAIM. 
In Point II of the respondent's brief on appeal, it is asserted 
that even if the trial court's findings on a joint venture relation-
lhlp between appellant and respondent are erroneous that this Court 
could affirm the judgment below based upon a theory that there was 
1ome form of cotenancy or joint ownership in the stock between the 
appellant an~ respondent. It is respectfully submitted that such a 
contention cannot be sustained. Appellant submits that if the Court 
were to find no joint venture relationship between the appellant and 
respondent the only other relationship cognizable from the posture 
of the case is that of a contractual relationship between the 
parties of borrower/lender. 
Appellant filed his verified complaint alleging that there were 
a series ~i loans betw~en appellant and respondents for which the 
appellant pled~ed the stock which was the s~bject of the complaint 
(R. 2-~). It was appellant's contention that appellant had pled~~d 
stock as security for loans from respo~Jents and thJt responjents 
were wron(fully retdinin~ the pled~e (R. 2-~l. ResponJen~s file·l 
-2-
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stock as the original relationship between appellant and 
(R. 39). Respondents plead as an affirmative defense to 
tiff's claim for relief the joint venture relationship asserted Ia 
the trial court (R. 40). The respondents' counterclaim alao alle&ed 
the creation of a joint venture relationship between appellant aad 
respondents and respondents' prayer for relief was based on a con-
tention of a joint venture (R. 41-43). The amended findinga of fact 
and conclusions of law as entered by the court treated only the 
claim of a joint venture relationship (R. 114). At no time did the 
respondents assert in the trial court, either in their pleadinga, 
evidence, or argument, that their assertions of the right to own and 
possess the stock in question was based on any other legal theory 
than one of joint venture. The record is devoid of any contention 
of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common relationship in the stock 
other than that emanating from the claim of joint venture. It is, 
therefore, submitted that respondents cannot now for the first time 
on appeal contend that if the trial court erred in finding a joint 
venture relationship that the judgment below can be sustained on the 
basis of a joint ownership either by joint tenancy or tenancy in 
common. In In re Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.:ld 45 
(1967), this Court observed, citing several prior decisions: 
"Neither of the first two points were raised 
in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial. 
Therefore, they cannot be considered for the 
first time on this appeal." 
This Court has consistently followed the position that where matters 
have not been raised in the pleading or a part of the record in the 
-3-
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trial court they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, 
Hanover Limited v. Field, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977); Nelson v. 
Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978); Park City, Utah Corp. v. Ensign 
Company, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978). It is therefore submitted that 
respondents' contention in Point II of their brief on appeal cannot 
be sustained since the issue was not properly raised and preserved 
la the court below. 
It is further submitted that the evidence in the instant case 
will not support this Court's recognition of either a co-ownership 
in the nature of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common. 
This Court has recognized that joint tenancies are basically 
creatures of contract. Hanks v. Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P.2d 836 
(1966). It has been generally recognized that joint tenancy inter-
eats can only be created by "grant or devise and never by way of 
dissent or oth~r act of law." 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint 
Ownership, §9. p. 100. Therefore, unless there was so'!le actual 
intention on the pdrt of appellant dnd respondents to create a joint 
tenancy interest none can be created by an incidental legal rela-
tionship. It has been stated that before a joint tenancy in 
property can be realized that there are four essential elements or 
unities. In 20 A:n.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §4, it is 
stated: 
"In other ·.,ords, rhere ::Just be the follo·.,in~ four 
uniti~s: (lJ ~nity of interest, (2) unity of 
title, (J) unity of ti:-ne, Jnd (-.) :Jnicy of 
possession. If anv one of tnese ele~ents is 
l d c ~ i nh . the est .1 t ~ .,,. i l 1 n c)[ l' e one i n J o in t 
tenJn2:'· ~, n2e, .~he~e t~o or ~-)~e oe~so~s 
..l:: q -__.; l :- e 3 n n ~ i '.' 1 1 '"' : l i : l . · :- e ~ ~ l ;) ;. ~ ) :: ·:> :- c: ·; .J : 
dilfe~(·nt t ;nc~ ,):- Jy Ji~-:-t.':-e~.t c,_':l\'e:.·.ln~t::'S, :.:--~-:: 
--.-
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estate created is not joint tenancy, for the 
unity of time or the unity of conveyance would be 
disregarded were this to be called a joint 
tenancy." 
See Hanks v. Hales. supra. In the instant case, it is clear that 
there is no unity of time or possession and that the various trans-
actions where characterized as loans or part of a joint venture 
occurred over an extended period of time. It is equally apparent 
that there was never intended by either appellant or respondent any 
relationship comparable to that of ~ tenancy or joint ownership 
in the stock. It is apparent that if there was no joint venture, 
the contract and relationship is significantly deficient, based on 
the instant record, to make out a claim of joint tenancy. Further, 
rhe burden would be upon the respondents to establish a joint 
tenancy by "clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence", 20 
Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §9, p. 101. 
It is further submitted that there is no co-ownership in the 
nature of a cotenancy or tenancy in common. It is well settled that 
stock or other personal property may be handed over to the possess-
ion of a third person as a pledge. Johnson v. Hibbard, 27 Utah 342, 
75 Pac. 737 (1904); Brown, Personal Property, §128, p 566. This 
does not create a cotenancy and will terminate a joint tenancy. 20 
~.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §17. In order for there to 
be a cotenancy or a tenancy in common, there must be a unity of 
pJssession, 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, §§1, 23. As 
lons as property is pledged or in the possession of another person 
L;r se-:urity no cotenancy or tenancy in common is created. Only 
-5-
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where there is • contr•ctu•l rel•tionship or a relationship intend-
in& to convey ownership would such a relationship be created. If 
the evidence is insufficient to establish a joint venture then the 
only evidence of record supporting any relationship between appel-
l•nt •nd respondents supports the appellant's contention that the 
rel•tionship w•s one of borrower/secured creditor. The facts in the 
inst•nt c•se do not show that there was any contractual borrowing or 
de•ling th•t would give rise to a cl•im of co-ownership. Although 
there w•s discussion concerning creation of a partnership relation-
ship between the parties, the matter only involved preliminary 
discussion and was never consummated. Respondents simply held 
possession of the stock as pledgees to secure their loan. Respond-
ents are entitled to the monies they advanced plus interest but 
nothing else. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING A JOINT 
VENTURE RELATIONSHIP AND THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO 
SUPPORT RESPONDENTS' BURDEN OF PROOF. 
In Point III of respondents' brief they assert that the burden 
of proof was on the appellant to establish his right to possession 
of the stock, citing general statements from cases with reference to 
the law of replevin. In order to determine the appropriate burden 
of proof in the instant case, it is essential to analyze the plead-
ings of the parties. The appellant filed the initial action and his 
verified complaint plead that the stock in question was given as a 
pled~e for loans made by respondents and that the respondents wror<-
fully retJined the pled~e (R. 2-4). The answer and cou~terclJi~ n' 
-6-
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the respondents is particularly significant aa to the bu~dea 
proof (R. 39). The answer in affirmative (firat) 
that the appellants loaned Strand the sum of $20,000 and furtlle~ ,,. , 
admits the receipt of 10,000 shares of Classic Minin& Corporatloa 
from Strand. Further, averments throughout the pleadln&• adalt tbat 
Strand turned over the stock in question in one form or eaotber to 
the respondents as part of their business arrangement• (1. 39-41). 
The pleadings and evidence show appellant's willingnesa to extin-
guish the debt and interest in obtaining release of the pledged 
stock not sold by respondents. In Paragraph 6 of reapondenta' 
answer, they assert a transaction as being part of the conteaplation 
of a joint venture arrangement (R. 40). In appellant's counter-
claim, an allegation is made that a joint venture arrang ... nt waa 
entered into on May 4, 1977, and the counterclaim further aaaerts a 
joint venture arrangement as being a defense to the appellant's 
contentions and justifying the actions and claims of respondents. 
Therefore, the posture of the pleadings was to recognize that the 
stock in question was turned over to respondents by Strand and that 
Strand had at least a possessory interest in the stock and respond-
ents af:irmatively asserted a joint venture relationship as a 
defense to the contentions advanced by Strand. Under these circum-
stances, it is submitted that the burden of'proof to establish the 
joint venture relationship was clearly upon respondents. This case 
brings into consideration maxims of burden of proof. The Latin 
phrase ~ incurnbit probatio ~ dicit; ~ gui negat is generally 
applied as to the burden of proof and simply means that "the proof 
-7-
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llel upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies", Black's Law 
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 606. Another maxim, ~ excipiendo fit 
lli.2!. 11 allo applicable. This phrase provides that "the defendant, 
bJ excepting or pleading, becomes a plaintiff", Black's Law Diction-
!!l• 4th Ed., p. 1482. As asserted in the same work where a party, 
in1tead of simply denying the plaintiff's cause of action, sets up 
1ome new matter in defen9e, the party bears the burden of proof. 
Thua, under these principles, respondents had the burden of proof. 
The rules for allocating burdens of proof are succinctly stated 
in James & Haz3rd, Civil Procedure, 2d ed. §7.8, where it is 
atated: "* • * the party who must establish the affirmative 
proposition has the burden of proof on the issue", (2) "* * * that 
the burden of proof is upon the party to whose case the fact in 
question is essential * * *" and (3) 
burden of pleading a fact must prove 
"* * 
it ... 
* the party who has the 
Applying each of the 
above principles, it is apparent that the burden of persuasion in 
the instant case, as to the joint venture relationship, was on the 
respondents on their counterclai~. The evidence was clearly to the 
effect that the stock in question was lawfully possessed by Strand 
and either given over to respondents as a pledge for loans or as 
part of a joint venture relationship. Res?ondents acknowledge 
receipt of the stock, ackno~ledge some loan transactions and 
affirmatively plead a joint venture relationshi?. Thus, the burde~ 
oi persuasion, once it wdS established th.lt Strand had an interest 
in the sto~~ anj that so~u of the transacti~~s ~ere loans, ~as ~~c· 
the respondt'nts to est.JtJlts:-~ their jo;n: ven:ure contention. 
-8-
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In 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures, S69, the general rule Ia 
stated: "The burden of establishing the existence of a joint 
venture is upon the party asserting the relation exist1." It 
generally recognized rule that a joint venture il never preauaed ... 
that the burden of persuasion is on the party alleging 1ucb a rela-
tionship. Preston v. The State Industrial Accident Com.i11loa, 174 
Or. 553, 149 P.2d 957 (1944); Bunn v. Lucas, Pino, & Luca1, 172 
Cal.App.2d 450, 342 P.2d 508 (1959). The standard Ia no different 
regardless of how the appellant's original claim for relief 11 
characterized. Although appellant did not proceed in accordance 
with the replevin rules (see Rule 65b, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure) appellant's claim for relief in part was for the return of the 
remaining available stock. Even if this is characterized as an 
action in replevin, the right of the appellant to an interest in the 
stock is recognized in the respondents' answer and counterclaim. 
Therefore, the rule stated in 66 Am.Jur.2d Replevin S98 is appli-
cable: 
"In case tbe defendant does not deny the allega-
tions of the complaint, but relies entirely on an 
affirmative defense, the burden is on him 
throughout to establish his defenses." 
Consequently, it is submitted that the burden of persuasion for 
tne respondents to prevail below was on the respondents. For the 
reasons stated in appellant's original brief, that burden was not 
met. The evidence simply does not conform to the legal requirements 
f0r a joint venture and is insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings . 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
lt Ia respectfully submitted that the assertions in the respond-
ents' brief to the effect that if the trial court's conclusions were 
incorrect as to a joint venture that a cotenancy relationship can be 
sustained and that the appellant had the burden of proof on the 
iaaue of whether the respondent should prevail are incorrect state-
aents of law. There is no basis to claim any relationship between 
the parties other than those encompassed within the parties' 
pleadings and evidence offered of record. On the right of the 
respondents to have an ownership interest in the stock sought by 
appellant in bringing the instant action, respondents bore the 
burden of establishing a joint venture relationship and as set forth 
in the appellant's principal brief on appeal, the evidence does not 
aupport the trial court's findings. This Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted 
RICHARD J. LEEDY 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
-10-
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